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ABSTRACT: In 1953, the UN General Assembly elected a low-key and relatively unknown 
personality as the second Secretary General of the UN. Dag Hammarskjöld, nonetheless, 
turned out to be one of the most entrepreneurial and innovative SGs that the UN has ever had. 
He invented peacekeeping, radically reformed the administrative structure of the UN, and 
promoted a crucial multilateral diplomatic role for the UN Secretariat. Behind this innovative 
approach to the politics of the UN, there was a personality with a deep and complex religious 
discernment that emerged occasionally in public speeches, as well as in private writing. This 
paper interprets Hammarskjöld’s norms entrepreneurship through the lens of postsecular 
theory and the concept of Habermasian institutional translation. It shows how -in contrast 
with merely secularist assumptions – Hammarskjöld’s religiosity shaped and advanced 
international political processes consistently with the principles of the UN Charter. 
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Introduction
1
 
In 1953, a relatively unknown diplomatic figure was elected Secretary General (SG) 
of the United Nations; only the second since the foundation of the organization. The 
world, perhaps even those responsible for Dag Hammarskjöld’s appointment, were 
not fully aware that the new SG was a skilled diplomat, committed to the principles of 
international peace, justice, and multilateralism. What is interesting for the sake of the 
present analysis is that this commitment to the principles of the UN Charter was not 
informed by a morally thin, liberal humanitarianism; instead, Hammarskjöld was a 
person with a spiritual and religious sensibility that inspired his international 
normative agency.  
This appears somewhat incongruous with the everyday business of politics and of 
international politics in institutions such as the UN embedded in the liberal secular 
context. How could someone like Hammarskjöld interpret the role of SG, 
harmonizing his religious and spiritual discernment with the provisos of neutrality and 
secularity inherent to this public international office? 
I advance the hypothesis that Hammarskjöld’s norms entrepreneurship as SG can be 
explained through a postsecular perspective. The paradigm of secularism would 
suggest that the only way to operate in a liberal context is that of restraining the 
religious self to the sphere of the private, adopting a neutralist, publicly “reasonable”, 
stance in the public sphere. Nevertheless, Hammarskjöld was constantly motivated in 
his public activity of SG also by his religious sensibility. In fact, as we shall see, 
religious commitment was an influential factor in the interpretation of his office.  
Hammarskjöld was capable of “translating” the semantics (Barbato 2010, 549) of his 
religious experience into the language of what he defined the “secular ‘church’ of 
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ideals and principles in international affairs of which the UN is expression.” 
(Hammarskjöld 1953a, 7) 
His activism, innovation, leadership in office, and his capacity to reform the 
Secretariat and the UN international role, (Lash 1962) are testimony of a will to 
contribute to the endeavor of a more just global order resulting from the “institutional 
translation” of religious principles into political directives, interpretative of the UN 
Charter principles.  
This essay does not intend to contribute to the biographical account of Hammarskjöld, 
for this task has already been egregiously carried out by others, (Urquhart 1984, 
Lipsey 2013) nor does it aim to delve into the vast debate on religion and 
postsecularism in international relations.
 2
 Instead, by juxtaposing the concept of 
postsecularism with a selective analysis of Hammarskjöld’s activity and discourse as 
SG, I explore how postsecularism and the concept of institutional translation can be 
operationalized to understand the inherent tension between religious sensibility and 
political activity in Hammarskjöld’s normative agency at the UN. In this way, the 
case of SG Hammarskjöld further validates the postsecular thesis that religion can 
constructively engage with the liberal and secular(ist) assumptions of international 
society. (Barbato 2012, Barbato and Kratochwil 2009, Habermas 2006)  It is perhaps 
not a coincidence that the role of leaders such as Martin Luther King, Mahatma 
Gandhi or Lech Wałęsa among others, can hardly be appreciated in their complexity 
by ignoring the religious orientation underlying their motivations.
3
   
The analysis starts by touching upon postsecularity with a special focus upon the 
concept of institutional translation. Then it moves on to introduce the activity of 
Hammarskjöld as SG. These will be cursory overviews, instrumental to the 
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subsequent examination of Hammarskjöld’s interpretation of his role of SG and his 
institutional translation of religious principles into political action reflecting the 
principles of the UN Charter. 
A Habermasian Understanding of Postsecularism: Institutional Translation 
As Mavelli and Petito observe postsecularism can be understood at least in two ways. 
Firstly, it can be an analytical category referring to the phenomenon of the “return of 
religion” in (international) politics. Secondly, postsecularism can be understood as “a 
form of radical theorizing and critique prompted by the idea that values such as 
democracy, freedom, equality, inclusion and justice may not necessarily be best 
pursued within an exclusively immanent secular framework.” (2012, 931) To an 
extent, both interpretations are relevant for our analysis of Hammarskjöld’s norms 
entrepreneurship, but the normative acceptation plays a more important role.  
Among the most influential thinkers who have theorized postsecularism there is 
Jürgen Habermas. According to Habermas, secularization is a process very much 
alive in our age, especially in the form of a “differentiation of functional social 
system”, whereby churches and religious groups “confined themselves to their 
competences in other areas of societies”.  Furthermore, secularization substantiates in 
the individualization of religious life, that is the experience of faith in the personal 
and subjective sphere, instead of casting its influence in the public sphere. (2008, 19) 
However, Habermas draws a line between secularism and postsecularism by 
observing that religion has not completely lost relevance in politics and society. In 
fact, our societies are not truly secular, as secularist theory claims; instead, they are 
postsecular because “In these societies, religion maintains a public influence and 
relevance, while the secularistic certainty that religion will disappear worldwide in the 
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course of modernization is losing ground.” (2008, 21) Although Habermas’s analysis 
is mainly concerned with domestic politics, it is not an overstatement that the same 
applies, perhaps even more forcefully, to international politics, where the return of 
religion has been widely observed. (Hatzopoulos and Petito 2003) 
Habermas notes that a postsecular society has not abandoned secularism nor considers 
it overcome by times; rather, it is a society in which there is a “change of 
consciousness” on the place of religion and religious communities in society, both 
among its religious and non-religious citizens. (2008, 20) 
How then should political institutions relate to a postsecular society? This question 
moves from a sociological analysis of religion to a prescriptive and, therefore, 
normative discussion. In a study of the role of religion in the public sphere, Habermas 
analyzes the idea of public reasoning in the liberal constitutional state, as developed 
by John Rawls in Political Liberalism (2005), and disagrees with him over what he 
deems an overly narrow definition of the role of religion in the public sphere. 
(Habermas 2006, 4-9) 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls has asked “how is it possible - for those of faith as well 
as the non-religious (secular) to endorse a constitutional regime even where their 
comprehensive doctrines may not prosper under it and indeed may decline?” (2005, 
459) His answer, according to Habermas’s interpretation, is that citizens not only have 
to accept the secular separation of church and state, but that public reasoning should 
rely on principles that would be accepted impartially by anyone, notwithstanding 
his/her religious or non-religious sensibility.  
As Rawls says: “reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, may 
be introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course 
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proper political reasons - and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines - 
are presented.” (2005, 462 Emph. Added) If we had to apply this approach to the role 
of the UN SG, and to Hammarskjöld relevant for our discussion, what we should 
expect is the articulation of a political discourse that is presented on the basis of 
“proper political reasons”. As we shall see below, however, Hammarskjöld referred to 
broader and also religious principles in explaining his normative agency as SG. 
According to Habermas, Rawls’s conditions overburden citizens who commit to a 
faith with a requirement incompatible with a liberal principle of tolerance. As he says 
“the liberal state […] cannot at the same time expect of all citizens that they also 
justify their political statements independently of their religious convictions or world 
views.” (2006, 8 Orig. Emph.)  
Habermas, therefore, advances the idea of “institutional translation”: a process 
whereby religious language can be decoded into an institutional language 
understandable by all citizens, no matter their religious views. The process should 
lead to a formulation of political stances that allows religious citizens not “to split 
their identity into a public and private part the moment they participate in public 
discourses.” (2006, 10) In this way, institutional translation enables religious 
communities to accommodate their claims into the institutional system of the state 
without relegating their religiosity to the private sphere, as would normally happen in 
a secularist context.
4
 
It shall be highlighted that institutional translation is a process that interests the public 
political sphere, which should take place in the pre-parliamentary phase of the 
political debate. Habermas states that once a citizen is in charge of a public office, he 
or she is acting within the framework of a secular liberal polity and, therefore, is 
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supposed to exercise its political authority with neutrality towards other world views. 
(2006, 9)  
As we shall see further below, the idea of an institutional translation of religious 
values into the normative framework of the UN Charter, reflects more thoroughly the 
kind of process that Hammarskjöld undertook as a person with a religious conscience 
actively engaged in the public political sphere of international politics. Instead of 
splitting his identity into a private religious self and a secular international civil 
servant, he translated religion in the institutional language of the UN. 
Habermas’s theorization of institutional translation as an approach to postsecular 
society has sparked an extensive debate beyond the scope of this discussion. Criticism 
has come from two main perspectives. One observes that his conceptualization is not 
persuasive in solving the tension between secular public institutions and religious 
citizenship: critics such as Fred Dallmayr (2012) imputes to Habermas a secular bias , 
which defeats the purpose of institutional translation as a remedy for the problem 
generated by postsecularism as a social phenomenon. They advocate the need for a 
radical re-thinking of secular institutions that goes beyond the current idea of 
secularism and of institutional translation as theorized by Habermas. (Mavelli and 
Petito 2012, 936)  
Others, for example Mariano Barbato(2012) and Friederich Kratochwil, (2009) adopt 
a more sympathetic, though not uncritical, stance towards Habermas’s view on 
postsecularism. Barbato for example uses postsecularism as a theory to discuss 
phenomena such as the Arab uprisings of 2012 or the fall of the USSR. (Barbato 
2012, 1085) Furthermore, institutional translation has been used as analytical concept 
in the analysis of norms diffusion processes in Bettiza and Dionigi (Bettiza and 
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Dionigi 2015) who illustrate how successful norms diffusion from religious actor can 
depend on their institutional translation. More in general, postsecularism and 
institutional translation are concepts that have the potential to re-evaluate critically the 
impact of religion on international politics complementing or correcting those aspects 
that a secularist approach would otherwise neglect.  
As Elizabeth Shakman Hurd says, we cannot fruitfully use the categories of religion 
and secularity as an ahistorical and apolitical dichotomy; instead, these have to be 
understood as contingent and historicized. (2008, 2011) José Casanova, from a more 
sociological perspective, has traced a process of “deprivatization” of religions and 
claimed that “we need to rethink the issue of the changing boundaries between 
differentiated spheres and the possible structural roles religion may have within those 
spheres as well as the role it may have in challenging the boundaries themselves.” 
(1994, 7) Postsecularism as an analytical framework questions the dichotomy between 
the religious and the political revealing a more entangled relationship between the 
religious sensibility of citizens and the institutions with which they interact.  
On the basis of these considerations, can we revisit the role of major norms 
entrepreneurs characterized by distinct religious conscience, in a way that is aware of 
this aspect? I will propose an answer to this question by considering the case of 
Hammarskjöld, who epitomized an effective engagement between religious 
commitment and international political agency in a liberal and secular institution that 
is the UN. An explanation of his normative agency that fails to consider his religious 
sensibility would provide only a partial explanation of a more complex interaction 
between religion and politics. 
Hammarskjöld: the SG as Norms Entrepreneur 
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Hammarskjöld was born in a family with a longstanding political and diplomatic 
tradition active in the life of the Church of Sweden (Urquhart 1984, 19-23, Lyon 
2007, 114, Lipsey 2013, 16, 21, Fröhlich 2007, 52-60). According to his biographers, 
he found his faith especially through her mother as well as on the basis of his 
relationship with the local clergy. (Lipsey 2013, 25-28)In this respect, Lipsey 
highlights the role of Nathan Söderblom, (the archbishop head of the Swedish church 
and a family friend of the Hammarskjölds) as a key figure in the spiritual and 
religious upbringing of the future SG. Söderblom, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 1931, was a lively intellectual religious pastor with a fervent inclination for 
dialogue among the Christian churches and ecumenism at large, all traits that were 
transmitted to Hammarskjöld.
5
 (Lipsey 2013, 38-9) 
At the age of thirty, after studies in economics and law, he was appointed Under-
Secretary in the Swedish Ministry of Finance and, subsequently, he proceeded in his 
career as a civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Among other tasks he was 
also involved in the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the setting up of the 
Council of Europe. These experiences were important to subsequently qualify 
Hammarskjöld for his next position. 
In 1953, at the age of 47, he was elected SG of the UN by the General Assembly 
(UNGA) upon the suggestion of the Security Council (UNSC). The election of 
Hammarskjöld to this office was far from being an obvious process. (Urquhart 1984, 
9-16)  
His predecessor, Trygve Lie, had resigned because of tensions between the Eastern 
and Western bloc regarding his stance on the Korean War. The UNSC had difficulties 
in finding candidates that could be accepted by acrimonious enemies with opposed 
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views on world politics. After a few months, the name of Hammarskjöld emerged, 
although not endorsed directly neither by the USA nor by the USSR. The choice was 
in part due to Hammarskjöld being perceived as a technocrat, with no strong political 
orientation, relevant professional experience, and from a country with a neutralist 
reputation. Indeed, his predecessor, also motivated by personal conflictive interests, 
expressed doubts over Hammarskjöld’s aptness for the office and claimed that he 
would have been “just a clerk”. (Urquhart 1984, 15, Lipsey 2013, 97) 
The judgment of Hammarskjöld as a technocrat proved useful for his election to 
office, but turned out to be a miscalculation. Hammarskjöld did embrace a line of 
neutralism
6
 as his office demanded, but this did not entail an apolitical interpretation 
of his job, instead he became a groundbreaking figure in the implementation of the 
SG office mandate. (Traub 2007, 186)  According to Robert Cox:  
Dag Hammarskjöld entered the UN with the public image of an 
administrator who would keep the United Nations’ house in order and avoid 
rash political initiatives –on both grounds probably contrasting with his 
predecessor in the minds of those who appointed him. Yet it was 
Hammarskjöld, responding to the opportunities thrown up by the world 
events following his appointment, who gave effective political content to 
the office of the Secretary-General. (1969, 209) 
Rather than remaining a mere enactor of heteronomous bureaucratic procedures, 
Hammarskjöld was a normative agent as he autonomously interpreted, promoted, and 
implemented norms and principles that would have remained otherwise subject to the 
sole influence of external structural constraints, such as the bipolar system or the 
superpowers’ interests of minimizing UN influence in international politics.7 His 
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agency, then, can be understood as “the ability to perform in a way that actually 
makes a difference” (Oestreich 2012, 12), in the sense that it is noticeable a 
significant mutation of the role of the Secretariat and its mandate as the outcome of 
his activity in office. 
It is possible to identify three areas of norms entrepreneurship
8
 in Hammarskjöld´s 
activity at the UN. The first regards administration and concerns above all the re-
organization of the secretariat and re-definition of the identity and role of the 
international civil servant.  
The second area relates to diplomacy, a classical practice of international politics 
which Hammarskjöld understood as the embodiment of hope alternative to war. 
Hammarskjöld made the UN Secretariat a central hub for multilateral diplomacy and 
inaugurated diplomatic strategies such as the “Peking Formula”, “quiet diplomacy”, 
and “preventive diplomacy”.  
Thirdly, the newly appointed SG established new courses of action for the UN to 
intervene directly in crisis management and prevention such as peacekeeping, 
observer groups, and UN “presences”. As we shall see in the following section for 
each of these areas of action, the religious sensibility of Hammarskjöld constituted an 
important factor shaping his activity. 
In the first year of his office, the new SG worked to develop and restructure the UN 
organizational framework, which was affected by its only recent establishment and 
which was under the attack of the superpowers. The USA had previously imposed a 
regime of control on the staff of the Secretariat as part of its McCarthyist policy, and 
therefore, undermined the independence and credibility of the UN staff. (Urquhart 
1984, 61-65) On the other hand, the USSR was harshly critical of Hammarskjöld’s 
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predecessor for his stance on the Korean War and therefore, the Secretariat itself was 
discredited in the eyes of the Eastern bloc. (Urquhart 1984, 53-54) The new SG 
reconfigured relations with the superpowers recovering the Secretariat credibility. 
Subsequently, Hammarskjöld was responsible for streamlining the structure of his 
office, establishing Under-Secretaries to support his work and significantly 
centralizing the activity of the UN in the hands of the Secretariat. Among the major 
achievements of the administrative reform of the UN, there was the consolidation of 
the role and reputation of the international civil servant at the UN. Hammarskjöld 
founded the ethics of UN international civil service; he emphasized the idea of 
“serving” with integrity the collective interest of humanity in abidance with the 
directives of the UN Charter. (Fröhlich 2007, 164-174) 
Within the context of this administrative reform, the new SG succeeded in 
establishing amicable relations with the permanent representatives of states at the UN 
and he, at least at this early stage, changed the attitude of the superpowers towards the 
organization. A telling example of this change is that the USA, at this point under the 
guide of Eisenhower, tasked the UN with overseeing the peaceful use of atomic 
energy. (Urquhart 1984, 84) Furthermore, relations with the USSR, although initially 
difficult, changed into a positive relation with Andrey Vyshinsky, the USSR foreign 
minister, which were subsequently conducive of a more positive attitude towards the 
UN. (Urquhart 1984, 53) 
Hammarskjöld fully capitalized on the progressive centralization of his office and the 
diplomatic network that he put in place to then engage in more substantially political 
operations. Three main examples can serve the purpose of showing the diplomatic 
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innovations that were introduced by Hammarskjöld: the 1954 hostage crisis in China; 
the Suez Crisis of 1956; and the Lebanon Crisis of 1958.  
In 1954, eleven US airmen were held in detention in China because of an alleged 
violation of Chinese airspace. The case sparked political reactions in the USA, who 
even threatened the use of force against the PRC. For the first time, the SG was tasked 
with negotiating a way out of the crisis. Eventually, this unprecedented role would 
come to be known as the “Peking Formula”. (Urquhart 1984, 105, Lash 1962, 548) 
Hammarskjöld put all his credibility, and that of his office, at stake in this first 
mission in the PRC. As it will be highlighted below, for Hammarskjöld diplomacy 
was the practical enactment of a principle of hope, which should have been exercised 
as alternative to any form of bellicose activity.  He, therefore, contacted directly Chou 
En-lai, and was received with his taskforce in Peking, where he established a personal 
relationship with the Chinese premier. Eventually, on the day of Hammarskjöld’s 
birthday, Chou En-lai sent a personal telegram to Hammarskjöld, congratulating him 
on his birthday and announcing a unilateral decision to release the American 
prisoners. (Urquhart 1984, 94-131, 126)  
The diplomatic initiative was considered a personal success universally 
acknowledged, including by Eisenhower. (Jackson 1957, 433, Urquhart 1984, 127-
128) The Peking experience established a precedent that entrusted the SG with an 
innovative role of independent and legitimate authority, mediating diplomatic 
relations for the purpose of crisis management. Hammarskjöld carved out this new 
role for the SG through an innovative interpretation of the mandate given by the UN 
Charter to the SG, especially under articles 7, 98 and 99. (Lash 1962, 548) His 
activity of interpreter of the Charter allowed him to gain a degree of autonomy in 
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diplomatic action that facilitated the diffusion of a new diplomatic practice.
9
 This was 
also possible because the mandate of the SG is among the vaguest in the  definition of 
its duties in the Charter as Thomas Franck has observes the “Secretary-General 
invents himself” defining and re-defining the limits and possibilities of his 
international role. (Franck 1985, 117-133)  
The events of the Middle East would have constituted another opportunity to advance 
the role of the UN as an actor promoting international peace through multilateral 
diplomacy. In 1955, the SG was tasked by the UNSC to undertake a fact-finding 
mission regarding the alleged violations of the truce agreements between Israel and 
the surrounding Arab countries that were under the surveillance of the UN Truce 
Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Hammarskjöld undertook the mission rather 
reluctantly because he was aware that success was highly unlikely in the volatile 
situation, but he was also conscious of the duty of the SG to act in anticipation of 
what seemed an impending conflict. The mission was relatively successful in 
establishing the SG as the only trusted channel between Jamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt 
and Ben-Gurion in Israel. Nevertheless, the Suez Crisis erupted in 1956 for reasons 
and causes that were beyond the SG’s control.  
The role of the UN was crucial in facilitating a speedy agreement on a ceasefire, but 
what was also particularly innovative of the UN was the fact that in the aftermath of 
the joint Israeli, British, and French war against Nasser’s Egypt, the UN deployed a 
peacekeeping military force in the region: the UN Emergency Force (UNEF). The 
idea of a UN military force was originally proposed by Canada to end hostilities and 
monitor the truce, but Hammarskjöld drafted the guidelines of the mission and gave 
instructions on its deployment after the ceasefire.  
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According to Brian Urquhart (who was personally involved with Ralph Bunche in 
setting up the new peacekeeping operation), “this document both laid the foundations 
for an entirely new kind of international activity and set out principles and ideas that 
were to become the basis for future UN peacekeeping operations.” (Urquhart 1984, 
180) Hammarskjöld boosted his already high reputation of tireless diplomat. The US 
President Eisenhower was quoted commenting Hammarskjöld’s role in the crisis as 
saying: “the man’s abilities have not only been proven, but a physical stamina that is 
almost remarkable, almost unique in the world, has also been demonstrated by a man 
who night after night has gone with one or two hours’ sleep, working all day and, I 
must say, working intelligently and devotedly.” (Urquhart 1984, 194)   
Almost simultaneous to the Suez Crisis was the Hungarian Crisis, for which the SG 
activity was remarkably less effective and influential. The case of Hungary is 
indicative of how the agency of the SG was aware of his limits and the risk of 
venturing into operations that would have faced insurmountable opposition from the 
superpowers. (Jackson 1957, 438-440) It is also for this reason that his diplomatic 
action has been considered not only idealist in its adherence to the Charter, but also 
realist in the appreciation of the limits of its office. (Troy 2010) As Ian Johnston 
observes, the effectiveness of the SG in norm entrepreneurship is determined by 
political circumstances that can facilitate or obstacle the emergence of new normative 
trends. (Johnstone 2007) 
In 1957, Hammarskjöld was re-elected with a unanimous vote by the UNGA. Very 
soon, the Middle East returned to be the focus of his diplomatic activity as SG. This 
time, the source of instability was the birth of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 
1958, which had repercussions on the stability of Lebanon.  
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The Christian factions of Lebanon were calling for international intervention 
(especially American) to contain the expansion of the pan-Arabist influence in Beirut. 
The political polarization between pan-Arabist and pro-Western factions caused the 
outbreak of a civil unrest, which Hammarskjöld feared might be a cause for a wider 
conflict. Hammarskjöld, therefore, engaged in intense diplomatic activity in the 
region to de-escalate the conflict, while sending to Lebanon a non-militarized 
observation mission (UNOGIL) to survey the alleged transfer of weapons from the 
UAR to pan-Arabist factions in Lebanon. He took advantage of his connections with 
Nasser, who assured the SG there would be no meddling into Lebanese affairs, but the 
situation escalated with the expansion of the crisis to Iraq, where a coup removed the 
pro-Western monarchy of King Faisal, producing a wave of instability in the region. 
Under the pressure of the Lebanese president, Camille Chamoun, the USA eventually 
intervened. Nevertheless, Eisenhower’s move tried to avoid direct involvement in 
local matters and provocation of an escalation on the USSR side. The services of the 
UN, therefore, were crucial in managing a crisis that could have spiraled into a fully 
blown conflict. Eventually, a UNGA resolution was adopted, calling for the 
maintenance of the independence and integrity of all states in the Middle East. 
(Urquhart 1984, 261-292) 
The crises of the prisoners in the PRC, Suez, and Lebanon, epitomize the innovations 
in diplomacy and UN practice introduced by Hammarskjöld’s mandate. He 
interpreted the diplomatic role of the UN Secretary as that of filling the vacuums left 
by the Bipolar System, in order to avert the risk of turning these spaces into Cold War 
battlefields. As Urquhart observes his commitment to an idea of preventive diplomacy 
was due to the principle that preventive diplomacy was far more effective as strategy 
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than corrective action, which is always more problematic and expensive. (Urquhart 
1984, 256)  
The analyses of Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy (Lash 1962, Cox 1969, Traub 2007) have 
highlighted his innovativeness and executive interpretation of his role, which rendered 
the Secretariat a hub for multilateral negotiations facilitated by strategies as the 
Peking Formula; quiet and preventive diplomacy; and the use of multinational armed 
forces for peacekeeping. 
According to Joseph Lash, Hammarskjöld was convinced that the institutional role of 
the SG was influenced by the constitutional profile of the US president and he 
interpreted his mandate by attaching a strong executive value to the vague directives 
of the UN Charter concerning the role of the SG. (Lash 1962, 547)  As Cox observes, 
Hammarskjöld was the first to attribute to the UN, and the Secretariat in particular, an 
“executive function” that became a reality with the implementation of the first UN 
peacekeeping missions in the Sinai and then the Congo. (1969, 213) In some cases, 
Hammarskjöld even acted on his own initiative, with no explicit mandate of the 
UNGA or UNSC, as in the Laos crisis of 1959. What is perhaps indicative of 
diplomatic ability is that Hammarskjöld’s executive interpretation of the SG office, 
although it was criticized, was never fundamentally undermined by the member states 
until the Congo crisis erupted. (Lash 1962, 555-560) 
The complexity of the Congo crisis prevents us from trying to give a superficial 
account herein. The withdrawal from the country of the Belgian authorities (as 
requested by a UNSC Resolution 143 of 1960) left the country prey to internal and 
foreign forces, determined to either maintain control or establish a new authority in 
the country. The Congo plunged into a civil war between internal factions, foreign 
 17 
 
mercenary troops, and attempts of secession -especially in the area of Katanga - all of 
these influenced by the interests of the great powers  and by multinational companies 
operating in the region. Within this context, Patrice Lumumba, the leader of the newly 
independent country, was assassinated. UN action in this situation was unprecedented 
for its use of military force (which Hammarskjöld tried to avoid as much as possible) 
in the attempt of preventing the break out of all-out war, but the UN was eventually 
drawn into the conflict. (Urquhart 1984, 570)  
Hammarskjöld realized, since the beginning, that this would be the last crisis he 
would manage. He sensed the limits of his possibility to act effectively and he let his 
closest collaborators know that he would have resigned afterward.
 
(Urquhart 1984, 
565)
10
 
When trying a last push to bring parties together for a solution of the imminent 
conflict, the SG flew to the Congo. He made desperate attempts to bring the 
diplomatic process back on track with a ceasefire. At one point, Hammarskjöld flew 
to Ndola (Zambia) to meet one of the parties involved in the conflict. His plane 
crashed, leaving no survivors. Susan Williams’s study has advanced substantiated 
hypotheses that the SG had been deliberately killed. (Williams 2011)  
In the briefcase of his last trip, Hammarskjöld had a pocket copy of the UN Charter, 
the New Testament, the Psalms, two books by Rainer Maria Rilke, and a book by 
Martin Buber that he was translating into Swedish. (Urquhart 1984, 587) Behind the 
international civil servant who innovated the UN, there was a man with a religious 
and spiritual life. Was the religious discernment of Hammarskjöld exclusively a 
matter of private life and introspective spirituality, or did it play a role in shaping and 
motivating his normative agency as the UNSG? 
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Reconciling the Religious Self with the Ethics of the International Civil Servant 
Let us resume Rawls’s question of “how is it possible - for those of faith as well as the 
non-religious (secular) - to endorse a constitutional regime even where their 
comprehensive doctrines may not prosper under it and indeed may decline?” (2005, 
459) The question remains central because we could ask it with regard to 
Hammarskjöld.   
As Urquhart puts it, “[Hammarskjöld] was a member of that small and lonely band 
who throughout history have engaged at the same time in trying to deal with the hard 
world of political and social reality and in searching endlessly for a spiritual meaning 
which transcends that world.” (1984, 23-24) His religious ethics may not have been 
ideal to operate in a secular institutional context, nevertheless the previous section has 
shown that it did not constitute an impediment of acting vigorously as the head of the 
UN; in fact, it was an incentive. How so? 
Much of the liberal reflection on the role of religion in liberal institutions sees 
secularism as the main answer to Rawls’s question. It claims, that comprehensive 
religious doctrines shall give precedence to justifications underpinned by sole political 
public reason, thus producing a “split” (Habermas 2006, 10) between a private 
religious self and the public civil self. To this stance, postsecularism replies with a 
more hospitable stance to religious views also because it values their potential for 
criticism and social and political transformations. Habermas proposes the concept of 
institutional translation discussed above as a way of mediating between the religious 
and the political spheres, instead of predicating for a hermetic separation of the two. 
Hammarskjöld’s way of reconciling his religious identity with his role of SG has 
more to do with a postsecular approach than a merely secular interpretation of the 
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relation between religion and politics. A selective reading of texts by Hammarskjöld 
shows his religious commitment to a progressive conception of Christian faith and 
how this can be understood as a motivational factor for the normative innovations 
introduced by him with regard to the role of the UN civil servant, multilateral 
diplomacy, and peacekeeping.
11
  
The main reference on Hammarskjöld’s religious reflections is his diary Markings 
(1964). Markings is a complex and hermetic text between poetry and prose which 
collects Hammarskjöld’s most personal reflections and feelings before and during his 
office as SG. (Fröhlich 2007, 60-74, Lipsey 2011) Even though it constitutes the most 
important source to approach Hammarskjöld’s spirituality, it does not constitute the 
ideal source for this analysis because, being a personal diary, its text was not meant to 
address the public and therefore does not provide examples of how Hammarskjöld 
related his religious sensibility to the public sphere.
12
 
Instead, I shall focus on some of his public statements, especially those in which the 
connection between religion and the role of the SG are most evident. Since the 
beginning of his mandate as SG, Hammarskjöld endorsed neutrality as the foundation 
of his office, but this did not mean that he would have not let his personal views come 
across the diverse audiences he met. (Fröhlich 2007, 129-30 and 179-182) 
Especially in the earlier stages of his career of SG, he publicly displayed his 
religiosity. The inaugural statement of his first mandate shows this clearly. He began 
by outlining the role of the UN as an organization primarily tasked with a “work of 
reconciliation and realist construction”13 and then concluded by reminding the 
audience of the celebration of the Christian Easter that had just taken place at that 
time. As he says: 
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May I remind you of the great memory just celebrated by the Christian 
world? May I do so because of what that memory tells us of the redeeming 
power of true dedication to peace and goodwill towards men? We are of 
different creeds and convictions. Events and ideas which to some of us 
remain the very basis of our faith are elements of the spiritual heritage of 
man which are foreign to others. But common to us all and above all other 
convictions stands the truth once expressed by a Swedish poet when he said 
that the greatest prayer of man does not ask for victory but for peace. 
(Hammarskjöld 1953b, 698)  
Hammarskjöld did not refrain from making obvious his religious sensibility in front of 
the UNGA. On this occasion, he refers to the Christian Easter as a memory that can be 
shared among different faiths as a reminder of the “redeeming power” of dedication to 
peace and goodwill towards men. In other words, he is giving an interpretation of the 
Christian tradition as a foundation for the action of peace and human goodwill. The 
vocabulary used in the statement, the reference to Easter, to creed, faith, spiritual 
heritage, and the act of praying, all belong to the language of a man of faith and are 
projected onto his institutional role of SG. 
The role of religion in informing his action as SG became even more obvious when, 
in a 1953 radio program, he was asked to discuss his religious beliefs. The SG did not 
refrain from engaging in the task and released a dense note regarding his religious 
views. The text is revelatory of how Hammarskjöld interpreted his role of SG as part 
of his religious life and not as a departure from it. At one point, he declares that: 
the explanation of how man should live the life of active social service in 
full harmony with himself as a member of the community of the spirit, I 
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found in the writings of those great medieval mystics for whom “self-
surrender” had been the way to self-realization, and who in “singleness of 
mind” and “inwardness” had found strength to say yes and to say yes to 
every demand, which the need of their neighbors made them face, and to 
say yes also to every fate life had in store for them when they followed the 
call of duty
14
 
Hammarskjöld declared how he interpreted his role of public civil servant as a call of 
duty to which he “surrendered” to serve the other. He did so following the teachings 
of medieval mystic literature.
15
 His role of SG, therefore, is in fulfilment of what he 
considered a duty justified by religious commitment. The declaration explains the 
kind of ethical background that motivated Hammarskjöld’s redevelopment of the 
international civil service, emphasizing the importance of moral integrity, the idea of 
“serving” the public interest, and doing so with a sense of full personal commitment.   
This is stressed with force in a message that Hammarskjöld sent to the UN staff, and 
which further highlights how he interpreted the role of the civil servant, not as simply 
split between private and public, but as a projection of the most intimate convictions 
on public activity. As he said to his colleagues: 
Our work for peace must begin within the private world of each one of us. 
To build for man a world without fear, we must be without fear. To build a 
world of justice, we must be just. And how can we fight for liberty if we are 
not free in our minds? How can we ask others to sacrifice if we are not 
ready to do so? 
16
 
Hammarskjöld conceptualized the work of the UN staff not in abstraction from their 
inner moral commitment, but as an expression of it. It can be inferred from this that he 
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considered the idea of serving the principles of peace, freedom, and justice as the 
enactment of his faith.
17
  
In further illustrating how Hammarskjöld’s religious conscience influenced the 
interpretation of his office, it should be considered how he conceived the UN as an 
organization. On various occasions, Hammarskjöld defined the organization as a 
“church of ideals”. In a speech given to the American Association for the United 
Nations, he articulated the concept as follows: 
I conceive the Secretariat and the Secretary-General in their relations with 
the Governments as representatives of a secular “church” of ideals and 
principles in international affairs of which the United Nations is the 
expression. (Hammarskjöld 1953a, 7)  
Urquhart reports that Hammarskjöld would often joke, defining the role of the SG as 
that of a “secular Pope”. (Urquhart 1984, 51) This intuition of an analogy between 
church and UN was, in fact, more than a joke and was suggested by the Pope himself 
in a meeting with the SG, when Pius XII referred to Hammarskjöld as his “lay 
counterpart”. (Lipsey 2013, 153)  
The analogy between the church and the UN shows that Hammarskjöld saw the 
organization as founded on secular principles - hence the reference to the secular or 
lay institution - but these principles could be interpreted by Hammarskjöld as the 
expression of his faith or as an embodiment of his religious community, i.e. the 
church. The oxymoron of a “secular church” is indicative of an unsolved tension 
between Hammarskjöld’s religious sensibility and the secular foundations of the UN, 
showing that he did not simply embrace an instrumental division between a private 
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religious conscience and a public secular institutional role. Instead, he made himself 
the interpreter of a religious commitment to the mission of the UN. 
This aspect was dictated by his deep conviction that individuals, in order to be loyal to 
others, could not be driven by a circumstantial appreciation of principles and values. 
On the contrary, relations should be informed by principles. As Hammarskjöld said in 
a speech at Johns Hopkins University, “we embrace ideals and interests in their own 
right, not because they are those of our environment or of this or that group. Our 
relations to our fellow men do not determine our attitude to ideals, but are determined 
by our ideals.” (1955) 
How, then, did Hammarskjöld keep his Christian ethics united with the values and 
principles of the UN if he did not share fully the secular proviso of a split between the 
inner religious self and the public institutional role? The rich literature on 
Hammarskjöld and his publications has reflected abundantly on that matter but one 
case has a special heuristic value when juxtaposed to the idea of institutional 
translation.  
In the address before the Indian Council of World Affairs in 1956, Hammarskjöld 
gave a talk that epitomized his interpretation of religious ethics as the source of his 
UN activity and somehow enacted what can be interpreted as a process of institutional 
translation, whereby religious semantics were used as the interpretative framework of 
the UN Charter. This speech is peculiar because Hammarskjöld did not have time, as 
he acknowledged, to prepare it in advance; therefore, its form and content are 
particularly direct. He began by asking where the UN stood after twenty years from 
its foundation. In answering this question, he stated that he would speak “frankly, 
simply, and in very personal terms.” (Hammarskjöld 1956, 569) 
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This “informal” Hammarskjöld then discussed the matter on two grounds. Firstly, he 
described what he called the “UN ideology” (a term about which he was himself 
skeptical) and secondly, with regard to its practical action. What matters for our 
discussion is the reference to the interpretation of the UN principles that he proposed 
with a reference to Paul the Apostle:
18
 some of his ideas, according to Hammarskjöld, 
are universally accepted in all philosophies and religions. He continued: 
I refer to the famous words of Saint Paul about the need for faith, hope, and 
charity, and I should like to try to define in those terms what I mean by 
United Nations ideology as I experience it in the Secretariat, in contact with 
representatives and, perhaps especially, in meeting the public wherever I go. 
I think that is proper to say that the man deeply concerned about peace, 
about world affairs, in simple human terms the United Nations stands as a 
symbol of faith. It is also an instrument for actions inspired by hope, and in 
many corners of the world, it stands as a framework for acts of charity.
19
  
This discussion presents the UN foundations as the embodiment of three principles of 
Christianity. Hammarskjöld used the New Testament and Paul the Apostle in 
particular, as lenses through which he read and interpreted the foundations of the 
organization he governed. In the following parts of this speech, he further deepened 
his explanation of the UN Charter as reflecting faith, hope and charity. He clarified 
that he understood the UN as an “embodiment of the faith of man”, “a realistic faith 
that peace is possible, that peace is within reach, given the simplest of all things, good 
will - good will, of course, also to make the personal sacrifices which are necessary to 
reach understanding and to find the common denominator.” (Hammarskjöld 1956, 
659) 
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The UN, then, is also “an instrument of action inspired by hope”. (Hammarskjöld 
1956, 660) In this case, Hammarskjöld explained that the hope he referred to was the 
alternative to war. He claimed that the conception of war as the ultimate resort of 
diplomacy, (or perhaps “as politics by other means”, as in the trite Klausewitzian 
adagio) was not acceptable now that the UN represented an unprecedented structured 
context for the peaceful resolution of disputes.  
We have seen in the previous section how relentless was the diplomatic activity into 
which Hammarskjöld engaged in his role of SG, establishing new diplomatic patterns, 
and eventually paying with his life in his attempt to reach out to the parties involved 
in the Congo conflict. Hammarskjöld’s conception of diplomacy as hope - an 
alternative to the ineptitude of war - established a solid connection between his 
religious credo and his professional practice. 
Thirdly, the UN stood for Hammarskjöld as a framework for charity. Hammarskjöld 
explained that by this he meant support for genuine and cooperative development 
among nations and not an act of patronizing benevolence. The UN is, in this view, an 
instrument to iron out unjustified and unacceptable differences on social and 
economic levels in a cooperative sense. Hammarskjöld referred to the UN and its 
group of auxiliary institutions for development as the “framework for sharing”. 
(Hammarskjöld 1956, 662) 
In addition to these considerations, one last instance of the connection between 
Hammarskjöld’s religion and his activity is the case of the UN Meditation Room. At 
the UN headquarters in New York there was, during Hammarskjöld’s time, a small 
space to host personal reflection and perhaps prayer, but Hammarskjöld’s sense and 
those of other members of staff must have been that this space was insufficient. 
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Hammarskjöld led the initiative to restructure this space and the Meditation Room 
eventually became a multifaith space “where the doors may be open for the infinite 
lands of thought and prayers.” (Hammarskjöld 1957) The room still stands as a 
tangible sign of how, in Hammarskjöld’s view, the UN should not be a place remote 
from religion but, instead, should be a place of peaceful convergence among faiths. 
The cases aforementioned show how Hammarskjöld interpreted the role of SG of the 
organization not as a departure from his religious commitment, but as an 
interpretation of it. Hammarskjöld thought that the UN ideals could be read through 
the lens of religious commitment. (Lyon 2007)  
The fact that Hammarskjöld established unprecedented diplomatic practices; 
introduced the executive use of UN forces on the ground; and formulated the idea of 
the civil servant who has a strong moral emphasis; can hardly be explained as 
commitment to a merely secular and liberal ideal of international peace and justice; 
instead it can be understood as a translation of religious morals into the principles of 
the UN. 
Conclusions: International Normative Agency beyond the Religion-Politics 
Divide? 
Let us try to bring together the components of the above discussion. I have said that 
there is increased awareness in the International Relations debate that the dichotomy 
between the secular and the religious is somewhat misrepresentative of a reality in 
which religion and politics are more intertwined than secular theory can capture. 
There are ways, postsecular theory claims, in which religious principle can 
substantiate in political action not necessarily undermining the foundations of a 
political order and in fact maybe even contributing to its development. This has 
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prompted reconsideration of the domestic and international political theory debate on 
the possibility of establishing the conditions for a more comprehensive approach to 
religions in politics. Habermas, from a normative perspective, has advanced the idea 
of institutional translation in this respect. 
With this in mind, I have presented Hammarskjöld as an innovator of the role of the 
SG; a norm entrepreneur who, through diplomatic skills but also having “history on 
his side” on at least a few occasions, was capable of changing the UN and possibly 
steering international politics away from the most obvious causes of conflict. Indeed 
there was opportunity to highlight, selectively, how he created instruments such as the 
Peking Formula; how he arranged for the first UN peacekeeping and observatory 
operations; and how he was a pioneer of preventive, quiet diplomacy. These 
innovations required boldness. Hammarskjöld was not a neutral steward of the 
member states; instead, he acted as an autonomous actor, enacting the directives of 
the UN Charter with unprecedented originality. (Lash 1962, Cox 1969)  
It is in this sense that we can consider his role as that of a normative agent. Contrarily 
to what would be a merely “structural explanation” (Wendt 1987, 340) of norms 
diffusion, this essay has highlighted the role of Hammarskjöld’s individual agency in 
shaping normative change at the international level.  
Thirdly, I have illustrated that a factor explaining the norm entrepreneurship of 
Hammarskjöld is that, beyond the skilled international civil servant, there was a man 
of faith, with a deep, complex, and occasionally troubled
20
 religious conscience. His 
official and unofficial political discourse opens a window on the religious sensibility 
that guided Hammarskjöld’s normative agency in the Secretariat. I have reported 
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about few of the most telling and relevant examples from his public discourses in this 
respect. 
By bringing these aspects together, I have observed that agency, when also motivated 
by a religious commitment, does not necessarily entail a privatization of the religious 
self to serve secular institutions based on a thin liberal humanitarianism. 
Hammarskjöld was an international political actor who predicated neutrality but did 
not advocate for a split between private commitment and public service. We have 
seen this with regard to how he addressed the UN staff when he said that it is not 
recommendable to separate one’s personal belief and commitment from being a civil 
servant. As Lyon observes, “morality for Hammarskjöld goes beyond the public 
private distinction. It is best explained as a three-way exchange between one’s own 
personal communion with God, God’s influence on the mundane world (manifest in 
public service), and the personal divinity that one applies there as well.” (2007, 117) 
His experience of SG was an interpretation of his will to serve a cause that he 
considered the enactment of his religious commitment. His reference to the medieval 
mystics, or perhaps even more clearly, his interpretation of Paul the Apostle discussed 
above, were examples that can hardly fit a merely secularist interpretation of the role 
of SG.  
Rawls’s proviso that a comprehensive religious doctrine should be put aside to 
prioritize “proper political reasons” (2005, 462) does not seem to apply to 
Hammarskjöld who did not refrain from making direct reference to religion. Instead, 
Hammarskjöld epitomizes and anticipates the idea of postsecularism as a functional 
relationship between politics and religion, advancing the diffusion of key norms and 
practices of the UN Charter. In the previous pages, a few key instances have shown 
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how Hammarskjöld institutionally translated his religious faith in guiding principles 
for his normative action.   
Hammarskjöld made of his religiosity a resource and a driving force of his 
international agency. He succeeded in this not by regressing into an exclusively 
intimate religious life, but in translating his credo into the UN ideal. The semantics of 
religion (Barbato 2010, 550) have been transferred by Hammarskjöld into the 
language of the UN Charter and its principles.  
A secular perspective on international politics would be insufficient to account for the 
normative agency of Hammarskjöld, and perhaps similarly for other figures as Martin 
Luther King, Mahatma Gandhi, or Lech Wałęsa for example.21 The case of 
Hammarskjöld shows that religion, as per the postsecular thesis, can be a source of 
criticism and a cause of transformation for international politics throughout a process 
of institutional translation.
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We cannot fully understand the international normative agency of Hammarskjöld 
through the lens of a merely secularist theory; instead, the category of the postsecular 
sheds light on the interaction between religion and international politics or, at least, 
explains why Hammarskjöld carried in his briefcase in Ndola both the UN Charter 
and the New Testament. 
                                                          
1
 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2015 ISA Annual Conference, the author is 
grateful to the members of the public and the panel who have provided valuable comments on the 
paper, in particular Gregorio Bettiza, Manuel Fröhlich, Catherine Goetze, Daniel Philpott and Nukhet 
Sandal. I am also grateful to Guido Dotti for drawing my attention to the personality of Dag 
Hammarskjöld. The feedback of the reviewers and editors of this journal has been very constructive 
and helpful, I am grateful for their contribution. This research was possible also thanks to the support 
of the Leverhulme Trust and the LSE Middle East Centre. The usual disclaimers apply. 
2
 See also the work of Manuel Frölich, which is not a biography but studies in detail the relationship 
between religion and politics in Hammarskjöld’s career as SG. (Fröhlich 2007) 
3
 For an analysis of Gandhi’s thought regarding religion and secularism see for example (Fernée 2014). 
The influence of religion on Martin Luther King’s activism is commonly accepted; see for example 
(Baldwin 2002). For a more specific analysis of King’s thought on social justice and religion related to 
 30 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Rawls’s theory see (Franklin 1990). The fact that religion and Catholicism in particular plays an 
influential political role in Poland is not a matter of dispute. Nevertheless, regarding Lech Walesa and 
the more specific influence of religion in his political activism there does not seem to be a systematic 
study. In his autobiography Walesa discusses in depth his religious views. (Wałęsa and Rybicki 1992, 
208-207)   
4
 Note that I subscribe to Habermas’s distinction between secular and secularist (Habermas 2008, 27) 
5
 For an account emphasising the more specific influence of Lutheran tradition on Hammarskjöld see 
(Huls 2006). 
6
 See also Fröhlich discussion of neutrality and impartiality in Hammarskjöld’s activity (Fröhlich 2007, 
29-30). 
7
 In conceptualizing agency, and in particular normative agency in international organizations, the 
author has benefitted from discussions of the concept in (Oestreich 2012, 1-25) (Chesterman and 
Annan 2007) (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006, Wendt 1987). A relevant discussion on collective moral 
agency is in (Erskine 2003). 
8
 For a discussion of the SG as norm entrepreneur see (Johnstone 2007, Traub 2007). 
9
 As regards the capacity of international actors to operate in autonomy through a strategy of norms 
interpretation see the principal-agent approach to international agency as discussed by (Hawkins and 
Jacoby 2006, pp. 206-207). 
10
 For a less sympathetic account of the events and the role of the UN, see the account of Ludo De 
Witte (Witte 2001a) and the exchange between De Witte and Urquhart in (Witte 2001b) as concerns 
the role of Hammarskjöld in the context that brought to the death of Patrice Lumumba.  
11
 To be noticed is that Hammarskjöld was intellectually engaged also with other religious confessions 
as Judaism, Islam and Confucianism as Fröhlich reports. (Fröhlich 2007, 88-90) In several of his talks 
and declarations there are references to Confucius, Rumi or Tagore among others. 
12
 There is a vast literature commenting on Markings to which the reader is invited to refer to in case of 
interest. See among others (Aulén 1969, Fröhlich 2007, 60-74, Lipsey 2011, Lipsey 2013, 53-94, Huls 
2010, Stolpe 1966). 
13
 With regard to Hammarskjöld’s emphasis on the importance of reconciliation as a function of the UN 
see (Fröhlich 2007, 37-38 and 43-44) and Lipsey (Lipsey 2013, 124). It is interesting to juxtapose this 
idea of reconciliation as the mission of the UN to Daniel Philpot’s work on justice and reconciliation in 
IR. (Philpott 2012) 
14
 The declaration and audio recording is available on line <http://thisibelieve.org/essay/16608/>. 
15
 As Lipsey reports the mystic writers to which Hammarskjöld refers to are Meister Eckhart, Jan van 
Ruysbroeck and Thomas a Kempis. (Lipsey 2013, 179) For a discussion of the influence of mystic 
thinkers and theologists see also (Fröhlich 2007, 75-90). Also the work of the progressive Christian 
thinker and social activist Albert Schweitzer and the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber had an 
important influence on Hammarskjöld’s religiosity and ethics, Hammarskjöld had direct contacts with 
both of them and commented in his scripts on their inspirational intellectual role. (Fröhlich 2007, 91-
115, Lipsey 2013, 69-70) 
16
 UN Press Release SG/360 (22 December 1953). 
17
 See the work of Catherine Goetze (forthcoming) in this respect and the analysis by Fröhlich 
(Fröhlich 2007, 164-174)  
18
 See in this respect also the analysis of Alynna Lyon the interpretation of the UN Charter by 
Hammarskjöld. Lyon emphasises a more specifically Lutheran reading of the SG religious ethics.  
(Lyon 2007)  
19
 He then explains that he does not intend charity as a “handing out operation with the benevolence of 
the “haves” in relation to the “have-nots”. I mean charity in the sense of mutual cooperation in a well-
understood common interest” (Hammarskjöld 1956, 659) 
20
 See (Lipsey 2013, 71-84) for a discussion of how Hammarskjöld’s religious life has gone through 
also phases of doubts. 
21
 See note 3 above. 
22
 On the importance of a successful institutional translation for norms diffusion as compared to failed 
institutional translation see (Bettiza and Dionigi 2015). 
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